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Abstract
High Speed of Learning in Financial Markets
We analyze the role of liquidity and collection of information in order to mea-
sure the speed of revelation of information during the preopening of order-driven
markets. We extend Vives (1995) model to the case where risk averse traders
receive a new private signal before each round of quotation of the preopening.
We show that price discovery takes place at high speed which is consistent with
the empirical studies of Biais, Hillion and Spatt (1999).
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Re´sume´
Forte Vitesse d’Apprentissage sur les Marche´s Financiers
Nous analysons le roˆle de la liquidite´ et de l’arrive´e d’informations dans la
mesure de la vitesse de convergence des prix durant la pre´-ouverture de marche´s
gouverne´s par les ordres. Nous e´tendons le mode`le de Vives (1995) au cas ou` des
agents averses au risque rec¸oivent une nouvelle information avant chaque tour de
cotation. Nous montrons que la vitesse de convergence est plus rapide et qu’elle
est valide´e par les e´tudes empiriques de Biais, Hillion et Spatt (1999).
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1 Introduction
How do prices aggregate dispersed information in financial markets ? This is one
of the fundamental questions in finance and in the theory of market microstruc-
ture. In his seminal paper Grossman (1976) proposes a theoretical framework to
understand the role of prices as a vector of information over one period of trad-
ing. In a dynamic setting, Kyle (1985) and Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992)
among others study the revelation of information during the trading day. Vives
(1995) focuses on the speed at which agents learn from prices during the pre-
opening of order-driven markets. Indeed, the Paris Bourse, Toronto, Tokyo or
Madrid stock exchanges have set up a preopening period in order to facilitate the
price discovery after the arrival of new information which occurs after a period
of non quotation (as overnight). In Paris, for example, during one hour and 45
minutes the participants of the market can send buy or sell orders and observe
the indicative clearing price. At any time before the opening of the market the
agents can cancel their orders. At the opening of the market a price is set and
the market is cleared.
In Vives (1995), risk averse traders are endowed with a noisy private signal si
about the liquidation value of a risky asset v. We extend Vives (1995) to the case
where agents receive a new signal before each round of quotation. As a matter
of fact, the flow of information received and collected by the market participants
during the preopening of financial markets is important as the agents exhange
information with each other, and try to obtain as more information as possible
in order to anticipate the opening price1. Then, it is likely the case that their
private information evolves over the time of the preopening. At each period,
traders observe the indicative price as well as their private signal and revise
their demand accordingly. Asymptotically, for a large number of quotations, the
learning process converges to the rational expectations equilibrium and traders
learn v, the liquidation value of the risky asset. The speed of learning is defined
as the speed at which prices converge to the fully revealing rational expectations
equilibrium - REE. In Vives (1995), the speed of revelation of information when
the liquidity of the market is provided by market makers is
√
n where n is the
number of round of quotations. But Biais, Hillion and Spatt (1999) in their
empirical financial study on the Paris Bourse reject this speed and find a speed
of revelation of information which is much higher and is equal to
√
n
3
. In this
paper, we show that such high speed of revelation of information can be attributed
to the collection of new private information2.
As in Vives (1995), to characterize the learning process we focus on two pa-
rameters :
• the reaction of the traders to their private information,
• and the speed at which prices reveal private information.
With market makers supplying the liquidity in the financial market (or alter-
natively competitive limit orders) - endogenous price function - our results are
the following :
• the speed of learning is n 32 ,
• and the reaction of the traders to their private information goes to infinity.
In fact, the liquidity effect described by Vives (1995) and the informational
effect, that we highlight in this model play the same symmetric role. It is why the
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revelation of information happens very quickly when traders keep on collecting
information and the liquidity is endogenously provided by market makers.
In the next section, we characterize the equilibrium conditions. In section 3 we
study the asymptotic properties of the market. Section 4 states some concluding
remarks.
2 The model: financial market with competitive
market makers or limit orders
At each round n there is a probability δn that v be revealed to the traders and
a probability 1 − δn that the tatonement process continues, those probabilities
are independent over time. As in Vives (1995) we assume that the sequence (δn)
is non decreasing. The probability that the tatonement process lasts until stage
n is (1 − δn)...(1 − δ1) which goes to 0 as the sequence (δn) is non-decreasing.
As Biais, Hillion and Spatt (1999) notice this is different from the Paris Bourse
where everybody knows the time of the opening. Nevertheless, this corresponds
to certain financial markets as the Frankfurt Bourse where the opening time is
random3.
In this market there are three types of agents - it is a competitive version of
Kyle (1985):
• Market makers who set the price conditionally on past volumes ωn,
pn = E(v|ωn), (1)
where ωn = (ω1, ..., ωn−1, ωn)4.
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• A continuum of informed agents in the interval [0, 1] maximizing CARA
utility U(x) = −e−ρx where ρ is the risk aversion coefficient5.
Each agent i at round n is endowed with a set of signals (sni = si1, ..., sin)
with
sin = v + εin
where v is the liquidation value of the normally distributed risky asset
v˜ ; N(v¯, σ2v) and (εi)i ; N(0, σ
2
εi
) are independent normally distributed
variables and independent to v too6.
Even if we consider that those private signals are independent over time,
we will see that a correlation does not change any of the results and that
one could consider the case of an AR(1) where εin = γ εi(n−1) + hin and
(hin)i,n variables are independent with v and hin ; N(0, σ
2
hi
).
• At each round, noise traders submit inelastic demand,
ut ; N (0, σ2u),
where ut are independent with (εi)i and with v.
Informed agents maximize their expected utility at each period conditional to
Iin their information both private and public. Past prices (pτ , τ < n) and past
volumes (ωτ , τ < n) are public information. Therefore Iin is equal to (s
n
i , p
n−1)
which are the past signals received from t = 1 to t = n and past prices until
n− 1 7.
We define Xin as the quantity demanded by the i
th agent and piin = Xin(v −
pn) his profit. Each agent solves the following program :
max
Xin
E(U(Xin(v − pn))|Iin) with U(x) = − exp−(ρx)
4
Therefore, the optimal quantity is:
X∗in =
E(v − pn|Iin)
ρV ar(v − pn|Iin) (2)
We focus on linear equilibria:
Xin = ainfin + Fn(p
n−1)
where fin is the OLS estimator of v over s
n
i (the mean of the private signals)
and Fn is a deterministic function of past prices.
By the SLLN we have
∫ 1
0
findi = v and therefore the aggregate volume is:
ωn = anv + Fn(p
n−1) + un (3)
The following proposition characterizes the linear equilibrium.
Proposition 1 There is a unique linear equilibrium where:
Xn(s
n, pn−1) = an(fin − pn−1) (4)
and ωn the total volume is equal to:∫ 1
0
Xndi+ un =
∫ 1
0
an(fin − pn−1)di+ un = an(v − pn−1) + un
The equilibrium price function is:
pn = pn−1 + λnωn
where an and λn are defined in the proof in the Appendix.
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3 Asymptotic properties: financial market with
competitive market makers or limit orders
The speed of revelation of information is captured by the asymptotic variance
τn = V ar(v|pn)−1 which is the informativeness of prices8 . When τn = +∞, v is
revealed.
We compute ν such that n−ντn goes to a constant Aτ∞ as n goes to infinity.
Aτ∞ is the asymptotic precision. By Amemya (1985) theorem :
√
n−ντn(pn − v); N (0, (Aτ∞)−1)
Vives (1995) shows that the presence of competitive market makers allow the
traders to react increasingly to their private information. In this case the speed
of convergence is
√
n, and
√
n(pn−v); N(0, σ2uρ2σ4ε). The following proposition
characterizes the reaction of the traders to their signals and the speed of the price
discovery process in our general set up.
Proposition 2 The reaction (an) to private information is increasing and goes
to infinity.
The speed of convergence is n
3
2 :
n
3
2 (Pn − v); N (0, σ2uρ2σ4ε)
Proof: see Appendix
The speed of revelation of information is therefore the cube of that in Vives
(1995). In fact, in our model informed agents have an unbiaised estimator of
v fin on top of the equilibrium price which is too an unbiaised estimator of v.
Informed agents can compute a new unbiaised estimator the precision of which
6
is a weighted average of the two others fin et yn. As a consequence, the precision
of their information is higher than in the case where they had only one private
signal over all the preopening period which accelerates the learning process.
Whereas in Vives (1995), the reaction to the private information (an) is in-
creasing, and goes to a limit (ρσ2ε)
−1, in this model there is no limit to the reaction
of the agents to their private information. an is not bounded because the depth
of the market λn =
anτu
τn
is of the order of n−3 whereas the order is n−1 with only
one private signal. This shows the role of competitive market makers or limit
orders in inducing revelation of information in a financial market where there is
an important collection of information. (an) goes to infinity does not mean that
the demand of the informed goes to infinity. This demand is finite and E|X|
goes to 0 9. Indeed, each agent is competitive and the reaction to their private
information is infinite because at the limit they know v perfectly.
4 Conclusion
We have shown that if the traders collect private information at each round of
quotation during the preopening period of an order-driven market then more
information is incorporated into prices and the speed of convergence towards the
fully revealing REE is consistent with empirical studies. Indeed, in the case where
the liquidity is endogenous the speed of learning predicted by our model is the
same as the speed estimated by Biais, Hillion and Spatt (1999) that is to say n
3
2 .
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APPENDIX
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Using (3) the price function is given by:
pn = E(v|ωn) = E(v|a1v + u1 + F1(p0), ..., anv + un + Fn(pn−1)).
Let define zt = atv+ut and yt the OLS estimator of v over (z
t). Vives (1995)
shows that pt = E(v|zt) (consequently to the fact that the functions F (.) are
deterministic) and so that pt = E(v|yt) by definition of yt.
Note that the main difference between the model presented in this article and
the one described in Vives (1995) is that the trader receives sequential signals.
We know that the information collected to evaluate v can be summarized by a
single variable, which is the OLS estimator of v over the (si).
We note fin this variable
10.
Therefore, Iin = (s
n
i , p
n−1) can be summarized by fin, the OLS estimator of
sni , and yn−1, the OLS estimator of p
n−1.
As in Vives (1995), we assume that the demand of a client is a linear func-
tion of his private information (summarized by fin) and the public information
(summarized by yn), and we find that:
Xin = an(fin − pn−1)
As in Vives (1995) we can write pn = pn−1+λnωn where the aggregate volume
ωn = an(v − pn−1) + un and the depth of the market is λn = anτu
τn
with τn =
8
τv + τuAn and An =
∑n
t=1 a
2
t and we show that an is defined as the solution of
the following cubic equation :
F (an) = (ρσ
2
εn
−1an − 1)τn−1 + ρa3n
τu
τn
= 0
Morever, we will show in the next proof that this maximum is unique.
QED
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
From the proposition above, an and τn can be seen as the roots of a cubic
equation, more precisely :
F (an, τn) = 0
Where F (an, τn) = (ρσ
2
εn
−1an − 1)τn−1 + ρa3n τuτn .
On the intervall <+∗ × <+∗, the function F is C1 and ∂F∂a is stricly positive.
Applying the theorem of implicit functions, at each point (a∗n, τ
∗
n) solution of
the equation above, there exists a function ψ defined on an open intervall Iτ∗n
(containing τ ∗n) which goes to an open intervall Ia∗n (containing a
∗
n) such that :
• For every τ included in Iτ∗n , if a is solution of F (τ, a) = 0, then a = ψ(τ).
• ψ is C1 and
ψ′ = −
∂F
∂τ
∂F
∂a
It is straightforward to show that on <+∗×<+∗ : ∂F∂a > 0 and ∂F∂τ < 0. Hence,
at every point (a∗n, τ
∗
n) the differential of the function ψ locally defined is
always positive.
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Therefore an is an increasing function of τn and an is unique. Moreover, τn
is obviously increasing with n, therefore (an) is increasing with n too. Hence, as
τn > na1, the informativeness of prices, goes to ∞. Moreover we have :
anρ(σ
2
εn
−1 + anλn(τn−1)−1) = 1
If an goes to a finite limit, the equation above is not verified when n goes to
∞ as the first term goes to 0. Therefore, as (an) increases, it goes to ∞.
Let f be a function of n such that an = n(ρσ
2
ε)
−1 + f(n). By substituing an
to this new expression in the equation above, it can easely be shown that
limn→∞f(n)/n = 0
Therefore,
an ∼ n(ρσ2ε)−1
Now let determine the speed of convergence.
It is straightforward that the standard deviation of the estimator yn is equal
to σu
∑t=n
t=1 at∑t=n
t=1 a
2
t
.
After computing the equivalent of the numerator and the denominator of this
expression when n goes to ∞ we find that the standard deviation of yn is:
σyn ∼ (
√
3σ2ε)
To apply the general central limit theorem (see Amemiya (1985)) we have to
check that the following condition is fullfilled:
limn→∞
Max{ak|k = 1...n}
An
= 0
We know that an ∼ n(ρσ2ε)−1 and An =
∑t=n
t=1 a
2
t ∼ n3 13( 1ρσ2ε )
2. Because an is
increasing
Max{ak|k = 1...n}
An
=
an
An
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which goes to zero as n goes to ∞
Hence, we use the theorem Amemiya (1985) and we have :
σ−1yn (
t=n∑
t=1
a2t )
1
2 (yn − fin); N(0, 1)
and that
√
n3(yn − fin); N(0, 3ρ2σ2uσ4ε)
QED
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Footnotes
1 This has been related to us by market practitioneers.
2 Biais and Martinez (1999) study the preopening in Frankfurt and in Paris.
3 It would be of interest to measure the speed of learning in Frankfurt as well
in order to see if this difference could change the result.
4 In this paper we consider competitive market makers or alternatively competi-
tion between traders who place limit orders. As Biais, Hillion, Spatt (1995)
notice ”the conditional probability that investors place limit orders (rather
than hitting the quotes) is larger when the bid-ask spread is larger or the
order book is thin.”
5 Alternatively, Medrano and Vives (2001) consider a strategic agent.
6 One could have considered that at each round of quotation the traders receive
a new signal with a positive probability. This would have diminished the
speed of convergence. Nevertheless we also consider the case where the
private signals follow an AR(1) and show that any correlation would have
changed our results.
7 As prices and volumes are observationally equivalent it is not necessary to
include the past volumes in the information set.
8 τi is the inverse of the variance σ
2
i .
9 It is straightforward that E|Xn| = (2/pi) 12anτ−1n−1 where
an
τv + τuAn−1
goes to
0.
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10 Consequently, there is is a very simple isomporphism between the two models.
In fact, in this proposition, it is sufficient to substitute fin to si in Vives
(1995) to derive the new results of this proof.
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